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Chapter Eight


Contentious Performances

The Case of Street Demonstrations

Bert Klandermans
(VU University)
and Jacqueliën van Stekelenburg
(VU University)

[8.0]

On the 6th of June 2006 hundreds of thousands of people took it to the streets of Madrid to demonstrate against the Spanish government's plans to negotiate with ETA. In an attempt to understand why people were taking part in the demonstration colleagues of us from the University of Santiago de Compostela interviewed over 400 participants in the demonstration. Our colleagues soon figured that the reasons why people took part were more complicated than one would be inclined to believe on the basis of the issue of the demonstration. This became clear when it was taken into account with which political party participants identified—the Partido Popular (PP) or the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)—and to what extent they identified with the AVT (Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo/Terrorist Victims Association) that was organizing the demonstration. To be sure, many demonstrators identified strongly with the AVT and this explained why they were taking part in the demonstration even if they were supporters of the PSOE (the party that was in government). However, quite some demonstrators did not so much identify with AVT but identified strongly with the PP (the party that not long before unexpectedly lost the elections in the wake of the bomb-attacks on the trains in Madrid). In fact, these people were not so much demonstrating against the negotiations as such, but rather more generally against the PSOE government which they accused of having 'stolen' their elections. Their answers to other parts of the interview confirmed this as-





sumption. Indeed, one could argue, that when a demonstration grows that big, it concerns more than the focal issue and addresses also more general dissatisfaction with the government in office. For this assumption to be tested one should compare demonstrations over issues, time and place; research that hardly exists. In this chapter we will unfold a theoretical model that we developed for such research to be undertaken. We developed the model in the context of a large scale comparative study among participants in demonstrations in seven—possibly more—countries in the three years to come. We will illustrate our exposé with results from research on demonstrations we have conducted over the past years.

This chapter, its subject, and its title are a tribute to Charles Tilly. ‘*Contentious Performances*’ is the title of Tilly’s last book, which appeared in 2008 after he died. Contentious performances are contentious because they concern claims that bore on someone else’s interests and or values—often governments; they are performances because they follow some learned and historically grounded scripts, but like any performance there is room for innovation, mostly in small ways. Such performances, Tilly argues, clump into repertoires of claim-making routines that apply to the same claimant-object pairs: workers tend to strike against their bosses, citizens tend to march against their governments, and anti-globalists tend protest against meetings of transnational organizations. Repertoires vary from place to place, time to time, and pair to pair. Moreover, when people make claims they innovate within limits set by the repertoire already established for its specific place, time, and pair. Repertoires vary in terms of their rigidity from absence of any repertoire to rigid repertoires that repeat the same routines over and over as exactly as they can. Tilly holds that overwhelmingly public collective contention involves strong repertoires: “participants in contention are enacting available scripts within which they innovate, mostly in small ways” (p. 15). He urges us to construct catalogues of performances and their characteristics and to engage in comparative studies in order to understand variation and change in performances. *Contentious Performances* is Tilly’s attempt to document what he and others have found in terms of variation from setting to setting, from issue to issue, from time to time, and in terms of the factors that control such variations and changes. The political context is one of those settings. The book sketches contextual variation in three main ways: between regimes; within regimes, between political opportunity structures; and within political opportunity structures, between the strategic situations faced by different claim-making actors.

Street demonstrations are examples of contentious performances. Tilly positions the origin of the street demonstration in Great Britain between 1758 and 1834. It became *the* performance staged by social movements; it soon became a multi-purpose tool rather than an instrument oriented to some single goal or political inclination. By the 1830s British activists had learned

[8.1]

[8.2]



to mount all three variants of the street demonstration that are still familiar today: the march through public streets, the occupation of a public space for a gathering, and the combination of the two in a march to or from the meeting space. Roughly hundred year later street demonstrations made it to France to become the major means of advertising political identities and programs in France after World War I. In the last two decades of the 20th century the number of demonstrations in Paris alone increased from 200-400 per annum to 1.000-1.500 per annum.

- [8.3] The question we personally have been working on all along is why individuals end up participating in collective action; a question Tilly never bothered to answer. He was much more interested in big structures and grand processes. Yet, there would be no contentious performances altogether if no individual citizen would decide to take part in it. With an international team of sociologists, political scientists, and social psychologists we designed a study that Tilly nonetheless would have appreciated¹. In the U.S. and in six European countries cf. the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and the U.K. we will go out to interview people in the act of demonstrating. We will try to understand how characteristics of nations, mobilizing contexts, and demonstrations influence *who* participates, *why* people participate, and *how* participants were mobilized.

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AGAINST THE WAR IN IRAQ

- [8.5] But before we embark on this endeavor, we take you seven years back. Saturday 15 February 2003, over 20 million people in more than 600 cities spread over more than 60 countries, and over all continents demonstrated against the imminent war in Iraq. Social scientists in eight Western countries coordinated by Stefaan Walgrave seized the opportunity to design and conduct the first comparative study of street demonstrations ever (see Walgrave & Rucht, 2010). In Madrid, Rome, London, Glasgow, Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, Bern, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle interviewers went to the demonstrations, interviewed participants, and distributed survey questionnaires to be filled in and returned to the university. Close to 6.000 people took part in our study, making for the largest study of street demonstrations in history. A demonstration against the same war, at the same day, meant a unique opportunity to compare. As the performances were the same, but the context varied, we could assess the impact of such variation. Were the participants in the eight countries different, and if so were these differences attributable to national differences or different mobilizing contexts?

- [8.6] Let's have a look at some of the results. Not so surprising, the participants in the eight demonstrations were very similar as far as their opposition to the war was concerned (Table 8.1). After all, they were all demonstrating against

the same imminent war in Iraq. But, note the huge differences in dissatisfaction with their government's efforts to prevent the war between the first five countries in the table and the last three: very high levels of dissatisfaction for the former and high levels of satisfaction for the latter. This again is understandable as the U.S. and the U.K. were about to go at war with the support of Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, while the governments of Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany had declared to be opposed to the war.

The Functioning Of Democracy

These two opinions relate, obviously, to the focal issues of the demonstration, but there is more. Look at the last row in Table 8.1. We asked everybody how satisfied they were with the functioning of democracy in their country. There appear to be three groups: on the one hand, demonstrators in the U.S. and Italy who are extremely dissatisfied, and on the other hand, demonstrators in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium who are on average moderately satisfied, and demonstrators in Spain and Germany who occupy a position in between. Remember what we said at the start with regard to the ETA-protest; if demonstrations grow big there is more than just the focal issue that mobilizes people. This becomes clearer if we look at the next table (Table 8.2). In this table we compare dissatisfaction with democracy as displayed in 2003 by our respondents with dissatisfaction with democracy observed in the years 2001 and 2004 among random samples of citizens in the same countries. In this and the next table the U.S.A. and Switzerland are missing because we have no comparable data of the general population.

Comparing discrepancies between demonstrators and average citizens creates two groups of three countries each: the UK, Spain and Italy, on the one hand, with relatively large discrepancies and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany on the other, with relatively modest discrepancies. Importantly, the levels of mobilization in the first group are significantly higher than that in the latter, as revealed in the last row in Table 8.2. The bottom row shows

[T08_001.t1] Table 8.1. Opinions about war and government

	US	UK	SP	IT	NL	SW	BE	GE	Eta ²
Opposition to war ^a	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.8	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.6	.07
Dissatisfaction with government's efforts to prevent war ^b	4.8	4.5	4.9	4.8	4.5	3.0	2.0	2.4	.68
Satisfaction functioning democracy ^b	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.5	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.3	.25
N	705	1129	452	1016	542	637	510	781	

Notes: ^a On a scale from 1 ("completely not opposed") to 5 ("completely opposed"). ^b On a scale from 1 ("completely satisfied") to 5 ("completely dissatisfied"). Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003

[T08_002.t1] Table 8.2. Dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy: percent not satisfied

	UK	SP	IT	NL	BE	GE
Iraq demonstration survey	70	62	93	40	37	58
Eurobarometer 11-2001	27	30	60	26	31	36
Eurobarometer 04-2004	34	29	60	33	35	48
Discrepancy with 01 ^b	43	32	33	14	6	22
Discrepancy with 04 ^b	36	33	33	7	2	10
Mobilization level Iraq demonstration ^c	1.6	2.5	2.6	.04	.07	.06

Notes: "Percent of respondents who are "not very satisfied" or "not at all satisfied".

^bDiscrepancy between average participant and average citizen in 2001 and 2004. "Size of demonstration as proportion of population (%). Source: Eurobarometer (2001; 2004); International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003.

the mobilization level of the six countries; the dichotomy in terms of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is strikingly reproduced in terms of the corresponding mobilization level: the higher the discrepancy the higher the turnout. The question is whether this is a real or a spurious correlation. One could argue that the opposition to war was very strong in Italy and Spain and that the mobilization levels in those two countries therefore were high, but opposition was strong in Belgium as well but turnout was lower, while negative attitudes towards war among the populace in the UK was of the same level as that in the Netherlands and Germany where turnout was significantly lower (see footnote 2 for the sources of this and the next figures). One could also argue that the level of dissatisfaction with the national government's efforts to prevent war was very high in the UK, Spain, and Italy, but it was high in the Netherlands too. Finally, one could argue that the discrepancy in Belgium was so low because the Belgian government was against the war, but the German government was against the war as well and the Dutch government was not. These and other considerations are addressed in Table 8.3. This table presents multiple regression analyses with the mobilization level of a country as the dependent variable and the attitudes about the war and national politics as the independent variables.

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The number of cases in this analysis is very small; hence, we must be cautious regarding the interpretations and conclusions. Yet, the pattern is consistent and allows for a clear conclusion. The differences in mobilization level between the six countries in the analysis can be nearly completely accounted for by the combined influence of opposition to war and dissatisfaction about the functioning of democracy. Note, that it is the discrepancy rather than the absolute level of dissatisfaction that makes the difference. Compared to countries with relatively low levels of mobilization countries with relatively high levels of mobilization had much larger proportions of

[T08_003.t1] Table 8.3. Level of mobilization and attitudes about the war and national politics

	Multiple regression: standardized beta's		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Opposition to war	.56	.64**	.54*
Dissatisfaction with government's policy	.43	.27	.25
Dissatisfaction with functioning of democracy	.26		
Discrepancy with Eurobarometer 11-2001		.44**	
Discrepancy with Eurobarometer 04-2004			.48**
Political efficacy			
N = 6			
Adjusted R ²	.85	.98*	.99**

*p < .10; **p < .05 Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003

participants who were more dissatisfied about how democracy works in their country than the average citizen. Note also, that being more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy rather than satisfied with the government's efforts to prevent war is what accounts for the different mobilization levels. Indeed, the lowering of the beta coefficient in Models 2 and 3 suggests that dissatisfaction with the government's efforts feeds into the more general dissatisfaction about the functioning of democracy. In its turn, this more general dissatisfaction made the level of mobilization increase. Obviously, what drives these people is not only discontent about their government's policy towards the war, but also deeper dissatisfaction about politics in their own country.

Social Embeddedness

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In yet another manner the countries differ. A movement's mobilization potential is not a collection of isolated individuals, nor is it isolated from other parts of society. Individuals are embedded in networks, and members of organizations, which in turn are embedded in multi-organizational fields. A movement's mobilization potential can be described in terms of the *social capital* accumulated in it. Lin (1999, p.35) defined social capital as "resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions." Paxton (2002) argued that associational life accumulates social capital, which "provides space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of the present government, and it provides a way for active opposition to the regime to grow." (p. 257). Part of the infra-structure of a movement's mobilization potential is the networks that connect individuals. Weak and strong ties and open and closed communication channels

[8.12]

weave a web of connections that influences how easy or difficult it is to reach a movement's mobilization potential. Strong ties are direct links with other people which are frequently employed; weak ties are indirect links—knowing somebody who knows someone else. Strong ties are more influential but do not reach beyond someone's inner circle; weak ties reaches farther, but are less influential. Closed communication channels have a restricted audience—only the members of an organization or the subscribers to a magazine, etc. Open communication channels have no such restrictions; mass media like newspapers, radio, or television are open to everybody. Open channels reach more people than closed channels, but have less impact.

[8.13] What about the participants in the antiwar demonstrations; how well were they connected to the mobilizing structure of the respective protest movements and what did that mean in terms of their mobilization? The first row in Table 8.4 shows, that many participants in the demonstrations had no ties to organizations that staged the demonstrations and that the countries differ in that respect: whereas in the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, and Germany around 60% of the participants reported to have no ties to the organizations that staged the demonstration; this was the case for half of the participants in Switzerland and Belgium, and 45% of the participants in Spain. In Spain on the other hand a large proportion reported to have weak or moderate ties. Strong ties were especially prominent in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium². In the absence of ties, mass media were important in the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany; and interpersonal channels in the U.S., the U.K., and Switzerland. Strong ties and closed channels were relatively important in Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the U.S. (Table 8.5).

[8.14] Apparently, the structures that facilitated people's mobilization for the demonstration varied for the eight countries. We investigated whether differences in the mobilizing structure could be linked to contextual variation. The contextual variation in a country can be described in terms of demand, supply, and mobilization (Klandermans 2004). The *demand-side* of protest refers to characteristics of the potential of protestors (the mobilization potential) in

[T08_004.t1] Table 8.4. Ties to organizations that stage the demonstration (%)

	US	UK	SP	NL	SW	BE	GE
No ties	61.9	62.2	44.9	58.5	49.6	49.5	58.4
Weak ties	7.6	14.1	33.0	13.3	11.9	13.1	16.0
Moderate ties	11.2	6.9	15.3	7.1	11.7	12.1	9.0
Strong ties	5.7	5.3	5.6	6.6	9.6	8.6	5.1
Very Strong ties	11.5	11.5	1.1	14.5	17.2	16.7	11.5
N	666	1116	448	528	629	503	769

Note: *Chi-square 1086.47, df 28, p<.001. Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003

[T08_005.t1] Table 8.5. Mobilization patterns (%)

	US	UK	SP	NL	SW	BE	GE
No ties + ...							
Mass media	15.0	15.7	27.2	25.3	14.1	16.5	24.6
Interpersonal channels	23.5	22.6	11.8	17.2	20.9	14.9	18.5
(Very) strong ties + ...							
Organization, ads, flyers, etc	12.6	10.3	1.5	12.8	13.5	15.4	9.5
N	666	1116	448	528	629	503	769

Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003

a society; the *supply-side* refers to the characteristics of the social movement sector in a society; *mobilization* refers to the techniques and mechanisms employed to bring demand and supply together (Klandermans 2004). Contextual variation can be described in terms of demand and supply factors. Demand factors concern characteristics of the mobilization potential of a movement, that is the proportion of the population that sympathizes with the movement's cause. The most obvious demand factor to include in our design is the opposition to the war in the public opinion in the seven countries. Supply factors concern characteristics of the social movement sector in a country. We included two supply factors in our analyses: the density of the movement sector as indicated by new social movement activity, union membership, party membership, and the contentiousness of the movement sector as evidenced by demonstration culture and strike activity in a country³ (Table 8.6). These indicators were simply correlated with our two aspects of the mobilizing structure: strength of ties and closedness of mobilization channels.

Because the number of cases is very small (N=7), coefficients have to be very high to be significant. Therefore, we use a lower significance threshold than usual. We found support for our assumption that mobilization patterns are affected by demand and supply factors. Indeed, open mobilization patterns tend to be more successful in countries where the opposition to the war was stronger: participants in those countries were more often mobilized via open channels. Furthermore, and also as expected, the denser the movement sector was in a country, the more closed were patterns of mobilization. Interestingly, in the case new social movements mobilized for action, this was reflected in the mobilization channels used: weaker ties combined with closed communication channels. Whereas in the case of union and party membership it reflected more in the significance of strong ties for mobilization. Finally, if the movement sector in a country was more contentious, mobilization for the Iraq demonstration tended to increasingly work via open mobilization channels.

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[T08_006.t1] Table 8.6. The influence of demand and supply factors on mobilization patterns: (Pearson's correlations)


	Demand	Supply: density of movement sector			Supply: contentiousness of movement sector	
	Opposition to war in public opinion	New social movement activity	Union membership	Party membership population	Demonstration culture	Strike activity
Strength of ties	.24	-.21	.48	.50*	.05	.36
Closedness of mobilization patterns	-.53*	.57*	.33	-.19	-.72**	-.43

* $p < .20$; ** $p < .05$. Source: International Peace Protest Survey (IPPS) 2003

- [8.16] In practice, demand and supply interact in determining mobilization processes: high levels of demand and a contentious social movement sector make for open mobilization patterns (open channels, weak ties). Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands seem to follow that pattern. A dense social movement sector and relatively low levels of demand make mobilization patterns more closed (closed channels, strong ties). Belgium and Switzerland lean in that direction. But, as the level of demand rises, open mobilization practices can be successful too.

[8.17] THE DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION

- [8.18] Grievances, mobilization levels, and mobilizing structure all vary across the countries in our study. These results demonstrate how much of a difference contextual factors can make. Indeed, perhaps the most important finding of the Iraq-study was that the size and composition (who) of the anti-Iraq war demonstrations, the motivation (why), and mobilisation (how) of its participants varied strikingly between countries. Covering street demonstrations that were staged at the same time and concerned identical issues we found remarkable differences between nations. Mobilisation campaigns, coalitions, turnout, and attitudes of the individual protesters all varied. If this holds for the same street demonstration, differences will be even larger for different street demonstrations, as demonstrated by Walgrave and Verhulst (2010) in a comparison of demonstrations in Belgium. Hence, we know that the same demonstration in different countries and different demonstrations in the same country produce diverging dynamics of protest. Yet, systematic knowledge of how protest demonstrations vary and how that variation is influenced by contextual variation is largely lacking. Indeed, we still do not know how the diverse levels—national socio-political context and mobilising con-




text—influence who protests, why they do so and how they are mobilised. To be sure, participants in individual demonstrations have been subject of investigation; hence, we might know who took part in a specific demonstration and why and how they were mobilized, but whether the participants in various demonstrations in the same country, or the same demonstration in various countries differ, we hardly know; nor do we know much about the extent to which the composition of the participants and their motives change during the life course of a movement and what causes this variation. In short, we must study the context in which demonstrations are staged and learn how contextual differences and changes impact on who participates for what reasons, and how s/he was mobilized.


We assume that the following contextual factors influence the characteristics of the protestors: (1) *nation*, i.e. the national political system in which demonstrations are staged; (2) *mobilizing context*, i.e. the demand and supply-side of protest, and the techniques of mobilization; and (3) *demonstration*, i.e. the characteristics of the demonstration. Our central tenet is that a specific national context generates a specific mobilizing context; that the interaction of nation and mobilizing context produces a specific type of demonstration; that a specific type of demonstration brings a specific group of protestors into the streets. We assume that the composition of the group of protestors, their motives and the way they are mobilized result from the interaction of national context, mobilizing context, and type of demonstration. This is what Figure 8.1 displays. The following paragraphs offer a short elaboration of the key-elements of the model.

Nations

Nations vary in terms of the circumstances they create for political protest. The political opportunity structure, the openness of the political system for challengers, the access points available for people to defend their interests and express their opinions, the temporal political configuration, are all iden-



[8f1] Figure 8.1.



tified as determinants of the incidence and type of protest (Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1998; Koopmans 1999; Tilly 2008). Dynamics of protest are shaped by socio-political characteristics of a country (see Koopmans et al. 2005). In open political systems, such as for instance The Netherlands, there is space for negotiation whereas in closed political systems, for instance France, this is much less so. This may imply that the French are more motivated to participate in protest than the Dutch and that the protest cultures in the two countries differ. In the Netherlands protest demonstrations are rare, in France they have become the most frequently employed form of contention. It may also imply that protest issue in France more often than in the Netherlands become matters of principle rather than interests. More generally, the public mood (Rahn 2004) in a country might influence the way problems are framed, which emotions are experienced and what the participation motives are. Problems framed in terms of violated principles, for instance, induce a state of indignation whereas problems framed in violated interests lead to anger (Elster, 1996).

[8.22] Mobilizing Contexts

[8.23] As mentioned previously, the mobilizing context in a country can be described in terms of demand, supply, and mobilization (Klandermans 2004). We propose that the interaction of demand, supply and mobilization influences the dynamics of protest participation.

[8.24] Demand

[8.25] A demand for protest begins with levels of grievances in a society (Klandermans 1997). For grievances to become the focus of collective action the people involved must develop a politicized collective identity. In the course of the process of politicization the awareness that grievances are shared develops, adversarial framing defines who the opponents are, and attempts are made to mobilize third parties or public support. More and more population groups employ protest as a mean to communicate their grievances (Klandermans, 2001; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). At the same time, migration has made Western societies more diverse (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy 2005). Grievances globalize as well, depicted by a growing consciousness of issues such as global justice or a shared concern for the climate. All in all, more diverse constituencies with more diverse grievances, are more often opting for protest to communicate their grievances and ventilate their anger.

Supply

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The supply-side of protest concerns the characteristics of the social movement sector in a society, its strength, its diversity, its contentiousness. The movement sector, however, does not exist in a vacuum, it is embedded in a multi-organizational field consisting of potential allies and opponents. As the conflict intensifies, increasingly actors in the organizational field are challenged to take sides. Traditionally, the social movement sector is conceived of as a conglomerate of movement organizations (McAdam et al. 1996: 3), which provides the more or less formalized infrastructure on which protest is built (McAdam 1988; McCarthy and Zald 1976; Diani and McAdam 2003). Increasingly, however, we see protest participation rooted in everyday networks of participants and social movement actors involved in diffuse and decentralized networks (Duyvendak and Hurenkamp 2004; Melucci 1996; Taylor 2000). At the same time, enhanced ethnic diversity has created ethnically diverse social capital (Fennema & Tillie 2008). Finally, we see the emergence of 'global social movement sectors' (Smith & Fetner 2007). Hence, nowadays the more diverse traditional formal organizations supply protest opportunities are more and more supplemented by more loosely coupled mobilizing structures.

Mobilization

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Mobilization is a process that proceeds in analytically distinguishable steps. Klandermans (1984) makes the distinction between consensus mobilization and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization concerns the deliberate dissemination of the movement's viewpoints. The process of consensus mobilization has been elaborated much further by Snow and colleagues (Snow et al. 1986) into what is now known as frame alignment. Action mobilization transforms sympathizers into participants. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) have elaborated the process of action mobilization and broke it down into their four steps model to participation. Citizens must become sympathizers (consensus mobilization); sympathizers must be targeted so that they know about the upcoming event; sympathizers must be motivated to take part; motivated sufficiently to surmount the remaining barriers to participation.

Processes of mobilization bring a demand for protest together with a supply of protest opportunities. Globalization, the development of network society and information society has changed mobilization techniques radically. New information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet, e-mail, MySpace, MSN, cell phones have changed the ways in which activists communicate and mobilize. Traditional organizations seem to rely more on information channels such as flyers, and organizational publica-

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tions targeting their members whereas, in networks the channels employed are face-to-face, Internet, online social networks, and cell phones.

- [8.31] At a general level, demand, supply, and mobilization are supposedly shaped by national context. At a specific level, mobilizing context is further colored by characteristics of the demonstration, especially the issue. Little is known about the way mobilizing contexts vary, how such variation is determined, or how it impacts on the characteristics of a demonstration.

[8.32] **Demonstrations**

- [8.33] First and foremost, demonstrations vary in terms of the issue. In his dissertation, Verhulst (2010) proposes a distinction between ‘old’, ‘new’, and ‘consensual’ issues. Old issues are typical socio-economic issues, such as inequality, social security, industrial conflicts. Usually, they come with a network of formal, traditional organizations that stage the demonstration. New issues are more moral, cultural, life style kind of issues such as gender, GLTB, pro-life, pro choice, animal rights and peace an anti war movements. More frequently loosely coupled networks are engaged in the process of mobilization for demonstration regarding such issues. Consensual issues are issues that encounter massive support, such as the movement against drunken driving or marches against random violence. Such issues that meet broad support need very little in terms of organization to bring large numbers onto the street.

- [8.34] Furthermore, demonstrations can be ritualized, peaceful, or violent; with or without permit; with or without close consultation with the police. Demonstrations are usually staged by a coalition of organizers, but the composition of the coalition varies and depending on the coalition the composition of the crowd in streets varies. For example, the coalition that organized the demonstration against the war in Iraq in Spain consisted of major political and social organizations, while that in the Netherlands consisted of small leftist organizations. As a consequence the composition of the crowds demonstrating in the two countries differed significantly. The location and the weather conditions vary and so does the media coverage. As we are lacking systematic comparisons it is difficult to say how these variations impact on protest participation. Obviously, the populations demonstrating differ in size and composition but how this relates to characteristics of the demonstration is far from clear.

[8.35] **Protesters**

- [8.36] The last step in our model of the dynamics of contention concerns the protesters. Who are they and why do they take part? Also the motivation of protesters is context dependent. The type of demonstration, the interaction of de-


mand, supply, and mobilization, and the national context influence the participants' motivation. We conceive of motivation in terms of identity, grievances and emotions.

Identities, Grievances and Emotions

Social psychologists propose identity, grievances and emotions as mechanisms that help to understand why some people are motivated to take part in demonstrations while others aren't. Note, that motivation is not all there is. Remember that motivation is only one of the four steps to participation. Nonetheless, here our focus is on motivation. Strikingly, a comprehensive framework integrating identity, grievances, and emotions into a single model was lacking. We have been working on such a model over the past few years (Van Stekelenburg et al. 2009 and 2014). The model we developed and began to test assigns a central, integrating role to processes of identification. In order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions that characterize a movement's mobilization potential a shared identity is needed (Figure 8.2).

The dependent variable of the model (*the strength of the motivation to participate in collective action*) results from emotions, and grievances shared with a group that the individual participants identify with. Grievances supposedly originate from interests and/or principles that are felt to be threatened. The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they are and the more they are prepared to take part in collective action to protect their interests and/or to express their anger.

The emphasis in the motivational configuration can be more instrumental—people participate because they believe that this might make a difference; ideological—people participate because they feel the moral obligation to



[8f2] Figure 8.2.

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
express their view; or identity driven—people participate because they feel the social obligation to stand by the people they identify with. Emotions amplify and accelerate. The angrier people are the more likely that they will engage on political protest.

- [8.41] Recent work on multiple identities (cf Kurtz 2002) shows that the various identities people simultaneously hold, may come into conflict and guide behavior in different directions. People might find themselves under cross-pressure (Oegema and Klandermans 1994) when two of the groups they identify with end up on opposite sides of a controversy (for example, union members who are faced with the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being disloyal to the company or the country. González and Brown (2003) coined the term ‘dual identity’ to point to the concurrent workings of identities. These authors argued that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g. ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g. national identity). In fact, they claim that a so-called ‘dual identity’ is the desirable configuration, as it implies having sufficient identification with one’s primary group to experience basic security *and* sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude divisiveness (see also Huo et al. 1996). Studies among Spanish and Dutch farmers, among South African citizens, and immigrants in the Netherlands and New York (Klandermans et al. 2001, 2004, 2008) suggest that holding a dual identity stimulates subgroup mobilization, suggesting that some degree of identification with the nation is needed in order to mobilize for political action. Indeed our study among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam and New York revealed that immigrants holding a dual identity—that is identifying both with their ethnic group and their society of residence—were more satisfied with their situation. However, if they *were* dissatisfied, they were more likely to take part in collective action than those who were equally dissatisfied but did not hold a dual identity.

[8.42]

TO CONCLUDE

- [8.43] Street demonstrations are among the most frequently performed forms of collective action. There is no single day without reports in the newspapers of demonstrations somewhere in the world—be it Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Bolivia, Venezuela, France or Spain. Tilly has argued that such contentious performances obey the rules of strong repertoires. Participants in contentious performances are enacting available scripts within which they innovate, mostly in small ways. As a consequence, street demonstrations are the same and different every time. We have presented a theoretical model to account for these similarities, variations and changes.



Chapter 8

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The challenge for students of street demonstrations is to document these regularities in change and the variations in contention. This is easier said than done. Studies of demonstrations or more general of contentious performances are mostly done on single cases. As interesting as this might be, single case studies inevitably take all contextual variation away. It is impossible to tell whether these findings are typical for this specific country, this specific issue, or this specific demonstration. Only by comparing single cases with other cases, we will be able to disentangle the general and the unique. Only if we understand the peculiarities of a national political, social, and mobilizing context we will be able to make sense of the findings in a specific country or a specific demonstration. In order to verify such reasoning we need to conduct comparative research; we therefore wholeheartedly second Tilly's call for research—comparing contentious performances over place and time.

[8.44]

In the concluding chapter of *Contentious Performances* Tilly reflects on how such research can be done. He notes the tension between analysis that seeks to explain retrospectively how changes in performances and repertoires occur and analysis that seeks to show prospectively how previously existing performances and repertoires shape the ways that people make collective contentious claims. He proposes to resolve the tension dialectically by confronting and synthesizing the two perspectives:

[8.45]

Decompose contentious episodes into particular interactions. Detect the sets of interactions that comprise different sorts of episodes. Identify the learned performances that group certain episodes together. See how performances cluster within repertoires and campaigns. Watch how one campaign affects the next. Then analyze how incremental change from campaign to campaign compounds into larger-scale repertoire change. (p. 201)'


[8.46]

He continues to emphasize that systematic study of performances requires close description of interaction among participants rather than simple identification and counting of whole episodes. He makes the distinction between an epidemiological and a narrative approach. The former analyzes counts of contentious events such as strikes, street demonstrations, or violent attacks; the latter attempts to reconstruct single events as a sequence of actions and interactions. Tilly's own approach taken in *Contentious Performances* identifies a middle ground between epidemiology and narrative: 'close description of successive interactions within contentious episodes' (p. 206).

[8.47]

As we are social psychologists, we have tried to translate Tilly's call to the individual level of analysis; offering a theoretical account of what individuals decide to do faced with the choice to engage or defect, to take part or quit. Such choices we have argued are context dependent as are the social psychological dynamics that control the choices. As a consequence, traveling from demonstration to demonstration over time and place we expect to

[8.48]



observe differences and similarities.. Organizers, participants and authorities are surveyed and interviewed employing identical instruments and data are collected on the socio-political and mobilising context. Collecting data on the micro, meso, and macro level we aim to understand the regularities and variations between demonstrations.

[8.49] Let us close by citing Tilly's last paragraph which he features as an agenda for new research:

[8.50] Students of contentious politics should move away from classified event counts and single-episode narratives toward procedures that trace interactions among participants in multiple episodes. They should also look systematically at how alterations in political opportunities, available models for claim making, and connections among potential claimants produce changes in performances and repertoires. If the weaknesses of [the approach taken in this book] inspire my readers to invent different and superior methods for investigating contentious performances, I will cheer them on. (Tilly, 2008, p. 211)

[8.51]

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NOTES

[8.81]

1. 'Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing Contestation', www.protestsurvey.eu. [8n1]
2. Italy is missing in this and the following tables as the Italian team employed a sampling strategy that makes these results in Italy difficult to compare to that of the other countries. [8n2]
3. The degree of opposition to war in public opinion is based on the EOS Gallup poll on the war carried out in Europe just before February 15. General activity levels of new social movements in countries is derived from the European Social Survey (no data on the US nor on Switzerland) asking for participation in an activity of a humanitarian or a environmental/peace organization during the last 12 months. Figures for general union membership are derived from the World Labour Report 1997-1998 of the International Labour Organization (www.ilo.org). General demonstration culture in a country is based on the World Values Studies answers on questions about participation in a lawful demonstration. Strike activity levels are based on figures of the ILO, taking the yearly average of the absolute number of demonstrations recorded in a country between 1998 and 2003 divided by the population size. General partisan [8n3]

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membership in a country is based on Peter Mair and Ingrid Van Biezen, 2001, Party membership in twenty European democracies 1998-2000, Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1.